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Abstract: In this Editor’s column I discuss certain fruits and limits of applying
the notion of ‘performance’ to works of art. Art works can be viewed as perfor-
mances, the public furnishing of works’ final form. Concerts can be viewed as
performances of a work scored by someone else, the composer, but not all arts are
double in this sense. Moreover, art can be viewed as mirroring the psychological,
phenomenological and rhetorical aspects of human interaction, which exemplify the
way people scrutinise moral situations. Not all performances are artistic, let alone
art.
I. A SUITABLE SPECTATOR
The aesthetic situation within art practice, involves the psychological, phe-
nomenological and rhetorical factors at work in the appreciation of a work of
art. First, there is the rhetorics of a work’s affecting the spectator with its
meanings – not just its message, even if there is one. The work is decisive but
it is the spectator who has the appreciative experience, whence the impor-
tance of what it is like to engage in the appreciation, the phenomenological
factors. And, lastly, the psychological factors: why did the artist make the
work in this manner, and how do we, the spectators, retrieve the work’s psy-
chological reality as it surfaces in the work?1 We bring the work to life, by
not treating it as merely an object, and do this, among others, by mobilis-
ing our own history of experiences and suitably projecting it for the sake of
empathising with the work.2 ‘The task of criticism is the reconstruction of
the creative process, where the creative process must in turn be thought of as
something not stopping short of, but terminating on, the work of art itself.’3
Aesthetic Investigations Vol 5, No 1 (2021), i-vi
Art and Human Interaction
1. According to Richard Wollheim, ‘A suitable spectator is a spectator who is
suitably sensitive, suitably informed, and, if necessary, suitably prompted’.4
In this characterisation Wollheim deals with the permeability of seeing to
thought. I remember Documenta 7 in Kassel, Germany, in 1982, with Rudi
Fuchs as its artistic director. Fuchs juxtaposed works by different artists in a
room together, instead of showing a single artist per room as is traditionally
done to present the development in the artist’s œuvre. He made us notice
the similarities and contrasts between works of different artists, in different
styles. I paid more attention to the works and their properties than I would
otherwise. The works prompted one to ever new elements. But, if promptings
can be suitable, they can also be unsuitable by asking us to consider something
that is not really there – where, as Wollheim formulates it, we ‘[refuse] to
force upon the picture something that it doesn’t represent’.5 There was no
risk of unsuitable prompts in Documenta 7 as the prompting were left to the
spectator to make. Spectators were nudged, not forced. Nice.
2. If a curator would change the light in a room from white to brown or
blue, this would probably distort the viewing conditions in such a way that
the viewer can no longer suitably appreciate the works in the room. The
light might prompt the viewer to notice things they would never have noticed
in white light, but this would distort the work. Changes at a remove from
neutral viewing conditions prompt wrongly. If curating were an art form,
what would be the proper regard for an audience to appreciate a work of
curator art, say, an exhibition?6 The artistic procedure of curating would
consist in creating an environment that shows the exhibited works favourably
– transparent to the works as the artist meant them to be experienced by
suitable spectators.
The criteria of success for instances of an art form are normally gleaned
from masterworks, that is, works that abide by the relevant procedures and
show by themselves how an audience would most fruitfully appreciate them.7
But what would a masterwork in this curating art form be, other than an
exhibition that set itself aside for the sake of allowing the audience to fully
concentrate on the exhibited works, instead of thinking about the curating
– or one that would, by drawing attention to itself, lure spectators in, who
would subsequently concentrate fully to the works? Is curating as an art not
a contradiction in terms?
3. There is much of interest in Rembrandt’s Woman Bathing in a River,
1654 – the woman most probably is Hendrickje Stoffels (see fig. 1). The dark
forest in the background, Hendrickje’s dress which you can see is cotton, the
cheekiness of the way she lifts her dress, the nakedness of her legs – erotic,
but not pornographic, intimate – and her look. What is she looking at? She
does not appear to be staring absentmindedly at nothing, is she? Her look
seems to rest on some object, but she is not actively engaged with it – the
object merely fixes the direction of her gaze somewhat. Hendrickje’s interest
is with something else – with someone else, with the painter, Rembrandt. Did
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Figure 1: Rembrandt, Woman Bathing in a River, 1654
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Rembrandt see this look in her expression or did he construe it by painting?
I am convinced that Hendrickje had the look in her face, and that Rembrandt
noticed it, rather than forging it ex nihilo, so to speak, because an expression
like that – any facial expression – is too subtle and personal to make it up.
But then what did he notice, and how did he reproduce it onto the canvas?
By a repeated recognition, seeing that her gaze on the canvas fits what he
noticed earlier? Wittgenstein comes to our aid.
‘Think of the recognition of facial expressions. Or of the descrip-
tion of facial expressions – which does not consist in giving the
measurements of the face! Think, too, how one can imitate a
man’s face without seeing one’s own in the mirror.’8
The reciprocity in Hendrickje’s look and Rembrandt’s recognition of it
must have guided his painting. We see something similar in self-portraits
painted after the mirror. In the mirror we see the only person who cannot
look at us. We see this in self-portrait after self-portrait. Likewise, in Hen-
drickje’s facial expression we see her happy recognition of being looked at by
Rembrandt – scrutinised and painted all in good humour.
The audience appreciates a work by bringing it to life through attentive
engagement with it – it makes sense to understand this as somehow giving the
work its final form, if it weren’t for the fact that this is not shared or shareable
beyond the prompts one derives from it. We are not, thus, performing the
work, in the sense of giving it another appearance. A musical composition is
performed, often – though not necessarily – by others then the composer and
this is a necessary ontological step to completion because without sounding
the musical work is not complete. Music must be performed, but no single
performance is definitive for the work. Performance is necessary, but no par-
ticular performance is sufficient. The listener must pay attention to bring the
performance further to life in their appreciative experience. Calling auditory
appreciation a further performance recognises its importance, but it is not
shareable in the way the band’s or orchestra’s performance is. You can share
it only by collectively experiencing the music performance.
Did I just now perform Woman Bathing in a River in discussing the
painting? I don’t think so. All I did was prompt to certain features in
Hendrickje’s facial expression, hoping that others will see it this way, as well.
It is up to other spectators to assess the suitability of my prompting. This we
do by looking at the same object, the painting by Rembrandt, and the way
he portrayed his model in it. Rembrandt too, one wants to say, prompts us
to certain facets of Hendrickje’s behaviour and presence in the situation. But
he did it by painting her, and long before I did. My proposal is, for us to be
open to prompts of all sorts – acknowledging the permeability of perception to
thought, i.e. recognising the danger of ‘[forcing] upon the picture something
that it doesn’t represent’. The suitability of the prompting is in the actual
experience of seeing its object.
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4. The beauty in all this is the realisation that art mirrors – I am not saying
mimics, or represents, as the Rembrandt does – human interaction, in its
psychological, phenomenological and rhetorical aspects. The core of being an
animal is sharing the world with other members of your species. This is espe-
cially clear with the so-called social animals, more so with the moral species
of humanity. Humans have devised ethical systems to deal with human inter-
action. And one wonders what makes morality such a viable undertaking for
us, if it weren’t for the way we interact, and the power of assessing the other’s
intentions by looking at them – and by showing one’s own intentions to the
other. Looking at each other is what defines the human species, and keeps it
together.9 In the reciprocal practice of looking at one another, the aesthetic
facets of interaction, its psychological, phenomenological and rhetorical fac-
tors, ground the ethics of human being at home in the world.
This does not mean, or imply, though, that human interaction is art. To
be art means to function within art practice, the practice surrounding works
in particular art forms, artists, suitable spectators and art institutes, their
agency and intentions and the reciprocal feedback mechanisms holding the








6See Levinson 1990 for this notion of
‘proper regard’.
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